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We propose that investor beliefs frequently “cross” in the sense that an investor 
may like company A, but dislike company B, while another investor may like 
company B, but dislike company A. Belief-crossing makes it almost impossible to 
construct a portfolio that is comprised solely of every investor’s most favorite 
companies. This causes the level of excitement for portfolios to be generally less 
than the levels of excitement that individual companies receive from their most 
fervent supporters. Coupled with short-sale constraints, wherein prices are set by 
the most optimistic investors, this causes portfolios to trade at discounts. Utilizing 
various settings where the value of the portfolio and the values of the underlying 
components can be separately evaluated (e.g., closed-end funds), we present 
evidence supporting our proposition that, in financial markets, the “whole” is often 
less than the “sum of its parts.” 
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1. Introduction 
A large body of work emphasizes that financial market participants often disagree about 
the fundamental value of a company and that, coupled with short-sale constraints, this 
has important asset pricing implications (Miller 1977; Diether, Malloy and Scherbina 2002; 
Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen 2002; Chen, Hong and Stein 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong 
2003; Hong and Stein 2007). In this study, we propose that financial markets are marked 
not only by investor disagreement, but also by variation in belief crossing: Sometimes, an 
investor may like companies A and B while a second investor may dislike companies A 
and B (“no belief crossing”). Other times, an investor may like company A but dislike 
company B while a second investor may like company B but dislike company A (“belief 
crossing”). We suggest and provide evidence that variation in belief crossing has 
important asset pricing ramifications. 
 Conceptually, we note that in the presence of belief crossing, it is almost impossible 
to construct a portfolio that is comprised solely of every investor’s most favorite companies 
and in that regard perfectly pleases large investor groups. The maximum level of 
excitement that a portfolio of companies generates among investors is, therefore, almost 
always lower than the combined level of excitement that the individual companies in a 
portfolio generate among their most fervent supporters. In the presence of short-sale 
constraints, wherein prices are set by the most optimistic investors, this discrepancy in 
the maximum level of excitement becomes priced and portfolios trade at a discount 
relative to their underlying assets. The stronger the level of belief crossing is among 
investors, the more negatively investors perceive the “whole” relative to the “sum of its 
parts.”  
To illustrate, consider a simple setting of two investors and two firms, Apple and 
Microsoft. Investors disagree and their beliefs cross: The first investor is enthusiastic about 
Apple (perceived value = $10), but not excited about Microsoft (perceived value = $5). 
The second investor is enthusiastic about Microsoft (perceived value =$10), but not 
excited about Apple (perceived value = $5). While Apple and Microsoft each generate 
excitement among at least a subgroup of investors, because of belief crossing, no investor 
group is excited about the whole, “Apple-soft.” In the presence of binding short-sale 
constraints, market prices reflect the valuations of the most bullish investors. The market 
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values of Apple and Microsoft are thus $10 each, while the market value for Apple-soft is 
$15. The whole (here, $15) thus trades at a significant discount relative to the sum of its 
parts (here, $20).  
The difference in how much investors value the whole relative to the sum of its 
parts widens with the interaction between disagreement and belief-crossing, hereafter 
referred to as embedded belief-crossing: Even if investor beliefs cross, as long as investors 
hold similar views about the value of each asset, the fact that investor beliefs cross is of 
little practical consequence. For instance, even if two investors value Apple at $7.55 and 
$7.45, while valuing Microsoft at $7.45 and $7.55, respectively, Apple and Microsoft will 
trade at $7.55 each, the sum of each is $15.10, whereas Apple-soft will trade at $15. By 
the same token, even if there is investor disagreement at the firm level, as long as investor 
beliefs do not cross and a first investor group is excited about both Apple and Microsoft 
(while a second investor group dislikes both Apple and Microsoft) there will be a marginal 
investor, here, the first investor group, who values the whole just as highly as the sum of 
its parts.1  
We use US equity closed-end funds (CEFs) as our main setting to empirically assess 
the validity of our argument that investor beliefs frequently cross and that in the presence 
of belief crossing the whole is valued at less than the sum of its parts. CEFs and their 
holdings both trade on stock exchanges. Based on our proposed mechanism, if a CEF 
holds assets with a high level of embedded belief-crossing, that CEF should trade at a 
discount relative to the sum of the values of the CEF’s underlying assets. 
We impose two assumptions in our empirical design: First, we assume that investor 
beliefs can be approximated via quarterly earnings forecasts issued by brokerage firms. In 
particular, we conjecture that disagreement over a given stock across brokerages, as well 
as belief-crossing for a pair of stocks across brokerages, provide useful information about 
the level of disagreement and belief-crossing that is present among investors. 
Second, in our paper, we are comparing how investors value “the whole” relative 
to “the sum of its parts.” Since closed-end funds are mostly held by retail investors, we 
                                                          
1 In the Online Appendix, we formalize our intuition within a stylized model. In particular, our model 
highlights the key prediction that short-sale constraints coupled with embedded belief crossing leads to a 
discount at the portfolio level. 
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believe that when a typical closed-end fund investor values “the whole,” such an investor 
is more likely to look at a fund’s top ten holdings than the full schedule of investments: 
Unlike the full holdings, top ten holdings are prominently displayed on a fund’s website 
and a fund’s fact sheet. They are also easily retrievable through fund information 
aggregators, such as Morningstar or the Wall Street Journal. In contrast, obtaining the 
full holdings requires going over a fund’s annual report. Consistent with our conjecture, 
in a survey sent to 114 retail investors, 93%-100% of investors report to have considered 
sources, which prominently display a fund’s top-ten holdings. 38%-44% of investors report 
to have considered the annual report. 
To construct our measure of embedded belief crossing, for each of the 45 possible 
top ten stock pairs, we compute the average dispersion in earnings forecasts and augment 
it with information about whether the brokerage with the most optimistic earnings 
forecasts for the first stock tends to issue the most pessimistic earnings forecasts for the 
second. The resulting variable, PairwiseCov, is such that a large positive realization 
implies a high level of embedded belief-crossing. We then aggregate pairwise PairwiseCov 
to the portfolio level, InvCov, defined as the portfolio-weighted average PairwiseCov. 
Consistent with our proposition, we find that a greater level of embedded belief-
crossing among a CEF’s underlying assets comes with larger CEF discounts. Our panel 
regression of CEF premium on InvCov and a host of controls produces an estimate for 
InvCov of -0.491 (t-statistic = -2.68), suggesting that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in InvCov comes with a 0.49% increase in the CEF discount. For reference, the average 
CEF discount in our sample is 4.3%.  
To gauge whether it is embedded belief-crossing per se that generates our patterns, 
we examine whether our effect is stronger in situations in which a portfolio’s underlying 
stocks are more short-sale constrained. We use two proxies for short-sale constraints: a) 
the interaction of retail ownership and short interest (e.g., Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 
2005) and b) daily lending fees (a direct measure of the cost of short selling). We find 
evidence strongly consistent with our proposition as a high level of embedded belief-
crossing only lowers the value of the CEF relative to the value of its underlying assets 
when the assets are likely short-sale constrained. 
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In a second attempt to provide evidence that it is embedded belief-crossing per se 
that generates our patterns, we use broker mergers and closures (following Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2010; and Kelly and Ljungqvist 2012) as a negative shock to the level of 
embedded belief-crossing. Broker mergers and closures, hereafter simply referred to as 
broker closures, result in a drop of analyst coverage, which in turn decreases the level of 
embedded belief crossing.2 Broker closures are unlikely to be informative about the future 
prospects of the affected stocks. We therefore believe that brokerage closures produce 
plausibly exogenous variation in the level of embedded belief crossing. Consistent with 
our main analysis and in line with a causal link, we find that when a CEF experiences a 
decrease in its level of embedded belief crossing tied to a broker closure, its price (relative 
to its NAV) rises strongly and disproportionately compared with CEFs whose holdings 
are not affected by a broker closure. 
In subsequent analyses, we provide evidence that embedded belief-crossing is a 
broad and general force that helps explain a range of patterns across a wide set of securities 
and events, including exchange-traded funds (ETFs), mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
and conglomerates. 
Just like CEFs, ETFs are investment companies holding portfolios of securities, 
whereby both ETFs and their holdings are traded on stock exchanges. The market value 
of an ETF, like that of a CEF, can deviate from the sum of the values of its underlying 
assets, although the magnitude of this disparity is much smaller for ETFs than for CEFs 
due to the presence of authorized participants, who can create and redeem large blocks of 
an ETF’s underlying holdings.  
Employing an empirical design similar to the one we use for CEFs, we find that 
ETF discounts increase with the level of embedded belief-crossing. In particular, our 
results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in InvCov leads to a 1.5bps (t-
statistic = 2.24) increase in the ETF discount. Compared with the median ETF discount 
of 2bps in our sample, such a rise essentially translates into a doubling of the ETF 
discount. 
                                                          
2 A drop in belief crossing is mechanical if analyst coverage drops to one: in such case, within our empirical 
framework, all investors condition on the same information and there is neither disagreement nor belief 
crossing. In the data, we observe a strong decrease in the level of embedded belief crossing even in cases 
analyst coverage does not drop to one. 
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Regarding M&As, we note that the combined announcement day return of an 
acquirer and a target, in part, reflects the difference between the value of the joint firm 
(i.e., “the portfolio value”) and the sum of the values of the acquirer and target operating 
separately (i.e., “the sum of the individual component values”). If embedded belief-
crossing lowers the value of the whole relative to the sum of its parts, embedded belief-
crossing across acquirer and target should lower the combined announcement day return. 
Consistent with this prediction, our regression of combined announcement day 
returns on InvCov produces an estimate for InvCov of -1.713 (t-statistic = -4.72), 
suggesting that a one-standard deviation increase in InvCov is followed by 1.713% lower 
combined announcement day returns. This result easily survives the inclusion of a range 
of variables known to forecast M&A combined announcement day returns.3 
Finally, conglomerates are corporations operating in multiple industry segments. 
To the extent that investor excitement differs by industry, the valuation ratio of a 
conglomerate should fall below that of its single-industry counterparts.4 Consistent with 
this prediction, we find that a conglomerate’s “diversification discount” increases with 
disagreement about a conglomerate’s underlying industry segments.  
 
2. Literature and Contribution 
Our primary contribution comes from our novel proposition that investor beliefs 
frequently cross, which, combined with short-sale constraints, can cause a whole to be 
valued at less than the sum of its parts. Our evidence suggests that variation in belief 
crossing helps explain a wide range of price patterns and that, at least in financial markets, 
the whole is commonly valued at less than the sum of its parts. In general, our framework 
should be applicable to any situation involving portfolios of companies or large companies 
operating in multiple segments. 
In addition to introducing a new construct, we also shed light on the applicability 
of a prominent behavioral framework—that of disagreement models—and the relevance 
                                                          
3 Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002) employ a similar argument to explain the higher (seemingly 
excessive) valuation of equity carve-outs relative to a parent company during the NASDAQ bubble. 
4 As we discuss in Section 3.2.3, we are unable to construct a measure of embedded belief-crossing for 
conglomerates. 
6 
of a much-debated market friction—that of short-sale constraints. At their core, 
disagreement models presume that investor beliefs are correct, on average, but that 
investors often agree to disagree (due to, for example, overconfidence). In addition, some 
investors cannot or will not sell short (Miller 1977; Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen 2002; 
Scheinkman and Xiong 2003; Hong and Stein 2007). In other words, some investors do 
not bet against perceived overvaluation, but rather sit out of the market. Since, in this 
setting, market prices are determined by the optimists only, prices are generally upward 
biased. Moreover, prices rise as optimists become more optimistic, even if at the same 
time pessimists become more pessimistic. That is, holding investors’ average beliefs 
constant, the upward bias in stock prices increases with the level of investor disagreement. 
Subsequent work assessing this prediction finds that stocks with higher analyst 
earnings-forecast dispersion and those experiencing reductions in mutual fund ownership 
breadth (which suggests more investors sitting out of the market) indeed earn lower future 
abnormal returns (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina 2002; Chen, Hong and Stein 2002). 
While the existing evidence is consistent with models of investor disagreement and 
short-sale constraints, alternative interpretations remain. For example, investors tend to 
disagree to a greater extent regarding firms with many growth opportunities than 
regarding firms with mostly assets in place. Thus, one may argue that it is the exercise of 
growth options, rather than investor disagreement, which leads to the observed lower 
future returns (Johnson 2004). In addition, investors tend to disagree to a greater extent 
when there is greater valuation uncertainty (e.g., during the tech bubble), which also 
strengthens the effect of other behavioral biases, such as over-optimism (Einhorn 1980; 
Hirshleifer 2001). Over-optimism, in turn, can lead to higher current valuation and lower 
future returns. In addition, a growing body of work argues that few stocks are 
meaningfully short-sale constrained and that the practical relevance of short-sale 
constraints should be questioned altogether (e.g., Asquith, Pathak and Ritter 2005; 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang 2008; Kaplan, Moskowitz and Sensoy 2013). 
In this paper, we re-assess the disagreement framework and the relevance of short-
sale constraints by deriving an implication that is unique to the disagreement/short-sale 
constraint framework. In particular, we note that when investor beliefs cross, it is 
impossible to construct a portfolio that perfectly pleases large groups of investors and 
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contains only every investor’s most favorite companies. By the same token, it is also 
impossible to construct a portfolio that includes only every investor’s least favored 
companies. The level of investor disagreement at the portfolio level is therefore always 
lower than the level of investor disagreement at the individual component level. Put 
differently, even if investors disagree strongly about the value of the individual 
components, as long as their relative views are not perfectly and positively correlated 
across these components, disagreement partially offsets at the aggregate portfolio level. In 
our stylized model with belief-crossing and short selling constraint (see Online Appendix: 
A Model of Investor Disagreement and Belief Crossing), we show explicitly how offsetting 
disagreement can lead to portfolio discounts. 
Our empirical strategy, then, is to compare two assets, an aggregate portfolio and 
the portfolio’s underlying components. Both are nearly identical in terms of growth 
options, investor optimism, and other characteristics, yet they differ strongly along the 
dimension of investor disagreement: The aggregate portfolio tends to exhibit a relatively 
low level of investor disagreement, whereas the underlying components tend to exhibit 
relatively high levels of investor disagreement. As such, our approach provides a relatively 
clean and powerful setting in which to test the relevance of investor disagreement and 
short-sale constraints in determining asset prices. 
The idea that investor disagreement “has implications not only for the prices of 
particular securities, but also for the valuation of firms formed by mergers, of 
conglomerates, and of closed end investment companies” goes back to at least Miller 
(1977). Two contemporaneous working papers, Bhandari (2016) and Reed, Saffi and Van 
Wesep (2016) empirically assess Miller’s proposition and examine how investor 
disagreement affects corporate spinoffs and conglomerates assuming that beliefs perfectly 
cross. In contrast, we emphasize that the level of belief crossing varies significantly across 
stock pairs and we show conceptually (now with the help of a stylized model) that this 
has important asset pricing implications. Our empirical analysis corroborates the view 
that variation in belief crossing helps explain asset prices. We further emphasize variation 
in belief crossing as a broad and general force that helps explain a wide set of patterns 
across a spectrum of securities, ranging from closed-end funds to exchange-traded funds, 
to M&As, to conglomerates. 
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3. Data and Variables 
In this section, we introduce our CEF setting (Section 3.1.1), our ETF setting (Section 
3.1.2), our M&A setting (Section 3.1.3) and our conglomerates setting (Section 3.1.4). We 
discuss our embedded belief-crossing variable in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1 Sample and Measure of the Whole-relative-to-the-Sum-of-its-Parts 
3.1.1 Closed-End Funds 
CEFs are publicly traded companies. Rather than using the proceeds from an initial public 
offering (IPO) and subsequent seasoned equity offerings to invest in physical assets, these 
companies acquire portfolios of equity securities. Because a CEF itself is traded on a stock 
exchange, we can compare the market value of a given CEF (“the whole”) against the 
market value of its underlying holdings (“the sum of its parts”). 
We identify CEFs via share codes 14 and 44 in the CRSP database. We obtain 
CEF price-per-share and net asset value-per-share (NAV) data from CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT, respectively. The CEF holdings are from Morningstar. Most of the data 
for the controls come from Lipper. Our final sample contains 85 CEFs over the 2002–2014 
period. Our sample period is determined by the availability of CEF data provided by 
Lipper and Morningstar.5 
Our measure of “the Whole-relative-to-the-Sum-of-its-Parts” is the quarterly CEF 
premium, calculated as: 
Premiumi,t=
Pricei,t-NAVi,t
NAVi,t
.     (1) 
While price and NAV data are available at a higher frequency, we measure the CEF 
premium at the quarterly frequency to match the frequency of our dependent variable 
with that of our embedded belief-crossing variable, which, as we discuss in Section 3.2, 
can be computed only on a quarterly basis. As shown in Table 1, the average CEF 
premium in our sample is -4.3% (or the average CEF “discount” is 4.3%), with a standard 
deviation of 15.0%. These figures are similar to those reported in prior studies (e.g., 
                                                          
5 Following Chan, Jain, and Xia (2008), we exclude data for the first six months after a fund’s IPO and for 
the month preceding the announcement of liquidation or open-ending to “avoid distortions associated with 
the flotation and winding up of closed-end funds” (p. 383). 
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Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee 1995; Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman 1998; Chan, Jain, and 
Xia 2008; Hwang 2011). 
 
3.1.2 Exchange-Traded Funds 
ETFs are similar to CEFs in that both the ETF and the ETF’s underlying holdings are 
traded separately on stock exchanges. The market value of an ETF sometimes differs from 
the combined value of its underlying assets, although the magnitude of this disparity is 
much smaller for ETFs than for CEFs due to the presence of authorized participants. 
We include in our sample all US equity exchange-traded funds except for ETFs 
that track broad market indices (e.g., S&P 500, Russell 1000, Russell 2000, Wilshire 4500, 
Wilshire 5000)6 as investors in these ETFs are merely tracking the market and probably 
do not pay much attention to the portfolio composition. Following Da and Shive (2016), 
we obtain ETF price and NAV data from CRSP; we identify ETFs via share code 73. 
The ETF holdings data are also from CRSP. Most of the data for the controls come from 
Lipper. We have data available from 2003 through 2014 and our sample contains 461 
ETFs. 
Our measure of “the Whole-relative-to-the-Sum-of-its-Parts” for ETFs is again 
constructed using equation (1). As reported in Table 1, the mean (median) ETF discount 
in our sample is 0.47 bps (1.96 bps) with a standard deviation of 36.15 bps. These figures 
are in line with those reported in prior research on ETF discounts (e.g., Petajisto 2013). 
While the discount is small in percentage terms, given the size of the ETF industry, it is 
large in dollar terms. 
 
3.1.3 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Our data sources for our sample of 405 M&As are SDC, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT. Our 
sample period runs from 1989 through 2014. The combined announcement day return of 
an acquirer and a target can be seen as partly reflecting the difference between the value 
of the joint firm (i.e., “the portfolio value”) and the sum of the values of the acquirer and 
target operating separately (i.e., “the sum of the individual component values”). For 
                                                          
6 The full list of indices is available upon request. 
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M&As, our measure of “the Whole-relative-to-the-Sum-of-its-Parts” thus is the average 
cumulative abnormal return over days [-1,+1] across an acquirer and a target, weighted 
by their market capitalization in the month prior to an announcement: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(−1,1)= 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(−1,1)𝐴𝐴 +  𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(−1,1)𝑇𝑇,   (2) 
where t=0 is the day of the M&A announcement (or the ensuing trading day). Following 
prior literature, we use DGTW adjusted returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
1997) to compute CAR. As reported in Table 1, the average combined announcement day 
return in our sample is 2.1%; the standard deviation is 7.0%. 
 
3.1.4 Conglomerate Firms 
Conglomerates are firms operating in multiple industry segments. Our data sources are 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Our final sample spans the period 1984–2014 and contains 
2,792 conglomerates. 
 The measure of “the whole relative to the sum of its parts” for conglomerates is 
the well-known diversification discount, which is the difference between a conglomerate’s 
market-to-book ratio (MB) and its imputed MB (defined below), scaled by the latter. 
Premiumi,t=
MBi,t - Imputed MBi,t
Imputed MBi,t
.    (3) 
When computing MB, we use information for June of calendar year t to compute the 
market value of equity and we use accounting data for fiscal year t-1 to compute the book 
value of equity. To construct the imputed MB, we first compute the average MB for each 
two-digit SIC-code industry, Industry-MB, whereby we use only single-segment firms that 
are from the same market capitalization tercile as the conglomerate. The imputed MB is 
the sales-weighted average Industry-MB across conglomerate i’s segments as of t. 
Following prior studies, we winsorize our variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles. As 
reported in Table 1, the average conglomerate discount in our sample is 14.9%, which, 
again, is in line with figures reported in prior research (Berger and Ofek 1995; Lamont, 
Polk and Saaá-Requejo 2001; Mitton and Vorkink 2010). 
 
3.2 Embedded Belief-Crossing for CEFs, ETFs, M&As, and Conglomerates 
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To empirically assess our mechanism, we require both a measure of investor disagreement 
and a measure of investor belief-crossing for each pair of stocks. Our study approximates 
investor beliefs via analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
One concern regarding this approach is that analyst disagreement and analyst 
belief-crossing do not represent investor disagreement and investor belief-crossing. A more 
technical challenge is that a typical CEF or ETF portfolio is highly diversified. Yet, to 
construct our belief-crossing variable, we need a pair of stocks to be covered by at least 
two common analysts; in practice, most analysts focus on stocks from only one or two 
industries. 
We try to alleviate both concerns by computing our measures at the brokerage 
level.7 Constructing our measures at the brokerage level has two advantages. Consider the 
following example: 
 
 
Given that most investors deal with a small number of brokers for trade execution, 
it is plausible that some investors rely more heavily on some brokerage firms than others 
for information. In the above example, Morgan Stanley is always more optimistic than 
Goldman Sachs so it is conceivable that investors paying more attention to Morgan 
Stanley’s sell-side research will also be more optimistic than investors paying more 
attention to Goldman Sachs’ research. If so, disagreement and belief-crossing measured at 
the brokerage level provides useful information about the level of disagreement and belief-
crossing that exists among investors. Our focus on brokerages also facilitates the 
construction of the belief-crossing variable, as brokerage firms tend to cover a wide range 
of stocks through the simultaneous employment of multiple analysts. 
Note that we need not take a stand on the direction of the information flow, i.e., 
the degree to which information flows from brokerages to investors and vice versa. If 
brokerages impact investors’ beliefs, then brokerage-level opinions naturally translate to 
                                                          
7 For robustness, we re-run our analyses using analyst-level measures and we find similar results. 
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investor-level opinions. Even if brokerages are merely broadcasting the views of their 
various clients, the belief structure measured at the brokerage level remains a reflection 
of the belief structure among investors. 
Note further that we need not investors holding the underlying assets to be 
identical to the investors holding the portfolio of those assets. As long as the various 
investor groups rely to some degree on the reports produced by brokerages, the level of 
belief-crossing at the brokerage level provides useful information regarding the level of 
belief-crossing in the overall investor population. This does not seem implausible to us as 
analyst reports are disseminated to a wide range of audiences (through Yahoo Finance, 
Bloomberg, and other channels).8 
 
3.2.1 Disagreement and Crossing – CEFs and ETFs 
Our main analysis pertaining to CEFs and ETFs is based on CEFs’/ETFs’ quarterly top-
ten holdings. As alluded to in the introduction, we conjecture that retail investors, who 
are the primary investors in CEFs, are more likely to decide how much a given portfolio 
appeals to them based on a fund’s top ten holdings than based on a fund’s full holdings.  
 In particular, perhaps the nine most prominent information sources from which 
fund investors can draw when making their investment decision are: (1) a fund's website, 
(2) some other investment related website, such as Morningstar or a broker’s website, (3) 
a fund’s Fact Sheet, (4) a fund's Prospectus, (5) a fund's annual report, (6) discussion of 
a fund in a print or online article, (7) recommendation by a family member, friend, 
colleague, or other acquaintance, (8) recommendation by your financial advisor, or (9) 
advertisement. 
 Sources (1) through (3) prominently display a fund’s top ten holdings (Online 
Appendix Figure A1). Only source (5), i.e., only a fund’s annual report, displays a fund’s 
full holdings (among many other things). We suspect that, comparatively speaking, few 
retail investors study a fund’s annual report before making their investment decisions. 
                                                          
8 Having said that, in additional tests, we re-estimate our primary regression equations separately for the 
subsamples in which CEFs’ underlying assets are held more or less by retail investors, i.e., when there is 
more or less overlap between investors pricing the underlying assets and investors pricing the overall 
portfolios (CEFs are primarily held by retail investors). Our results remain significant in both subsamples, 
but are substantially stronger for the subsample of CEFs that are held primarily by retail investors. 
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Even if investors study a fund’s annual report, the full schedule of investments is generally 
less prominently displayed than a fund’s top ten holdings in sources (1) through (3). 
To assess the validity of our suspicion, we design a Qualtrics survey as shown in 
Online Appendix Figure A1, in which we ask the following two questions: (1) “If you ever 
invested in a fund and the fund was NOT an index fund, which sources of information 
did you use when first deciding which fund to invest in? [click all that apply],” and (2) 
“Once invested in a fund, which sources of information did you use when monitoring your 
investment and deciding whether to remain invested in the fund, pull your money out of 
the fund, or add more money to the fund? [click all that apply]” As potential sources, we 
list the aforementioned nine sources, plus a tenth named “Others.” 
 We recruit survey participants via Prolific (https://prolific.ac). We require that 
participants reside in the U.S. and report “yes” to the following two questions within 
Prolific: (1) “Have you ever made investments (either personal or through your 
employment) in the common stock or shares of a company?”, (2) “Have you invested in 
any of the following types of investment in the past?: ETF or ETC, Government Bonds 
or Stock Market.” Within our Qualtrics survey, we also ask “Have you ever invested in 
either a mutual fund, an exchange-traded fund, or a closed-end fund, and the fund was 
NOT just mimicking a broader index such as the S&P 500 (i.e., the fund was NOT an 
index fund),” and we require survey participants to respond with “yes.” Each participant 
is paid the equivalent of $30/hour for successful survey completion, which is above the 
minimum pay requested by Prolific of $7.50/hour. A total of 114 participants completed 
our survey. 
We report our survey results in Online Appendix Figure A2. In short, for our two 
questions, we find that 93% or 100% of survey participants report to draw from sources 
(1), (2) or (3), all of which prominently display a fund’s top-ten holdings. 38% or 44% of 
survey participants report to draw from the annual report, which, among many other 
things, contain a fund’s full holdings (a typical annual report is around 40 pages long). 
Not all 93% or 100% of survey participants may strongly consider a fund’s top-ten 
holdings when relying on sources (1) through (3). But relatively speaking, we still think 
it is more likely that fund investors value the whole based on a fund’s top-ten holdings 
than based on a fund’s full holdings. Under our conjecture, considering non-top ten 
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holdings adds noise. Since top ten holdings on average account for “only” 29.2% of a 
typical closed-end fund portfolio, such noise can be substantial.9 
Given our focus on top ten holding, each CEF/ETF in each year-quarter t produces 
45 possible top-ten stock pairs (=n*(n-1)/2). For each top-ten stock pair j,l covered by 
at least two common brokerage houses, we first compute the price-scaled earnings forecast 
dispersion for both stock j and stock l: 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑙𝑙 = StDev�𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)ℎ,𝑗𝑗 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑙𝑙�Pj or l ,     (4) 
where Forecast(EPS)h,j or l is brokerage h’s most recent forecast for quarterly earnings-per-
share. Because each brokerage firm assigns only one of its analysts to cover a stock, 
brokerage earnings forecast dispersion is equivalent to analyst earnings forecast dispersion. 
(However, brokerage-level belief-crossing is not equivalent to analyst-level belief-crossing.) 
We require that forecasts be made in the ninety-day period prior to the corresponding 
earnings announcement date and the corresponding earnings announcement date to fall 
within the ninety-day period prior to the corresponding portfolio holdings report date. Pj 
is the price-per-share for firm j as of the end of the corresponding fiscal quarter. We 
winsorize Dispersion at the 99th percentile. 
We compute Disagreement as the portfolio-weighted average dispersion across 
stock j and stock l: 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙.   (5) 
In our next step, we draw from the list of brokerage houses that cover both stock 
j and stock l and compute the Spearman rank correlation in earnings forecasts between 
these two stocks, multiplied by negative one: 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 �𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗�,𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙)� ∗ (−1).  (6) 
When the most optimistic investor in the first stock is also the most optimistic investor 
in the second stock (“no belief-crossing”) the correlation gravitates towards positive one 
and the Crossing variable gravitates towards negative one. In contrast, when the most 
optimistic investor in the first stock is the most pessimistic investor in the second stock 
                                                          
9 To assess the robustness of our findings, we also experiment with other portfolio cutoffs. Our results 
remain economically and statistically significant if we instead compute embedded belief-crossing based on 
the top 20, 30, 40, or 50 stocks (results available upon request). 
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(“perfect belief-crossing”) the correlation gravitates towards negative one and the 
Crossing variable gravitates towards positive one. A high realization of Crossing implies 
a high level of belief crossing. 
 Recall that our mechanism is a joint effect of both investor disagreement and 
investor belief-crossing. Our main independent variable thus is the interaction of investor 
disagreement with investor belief-crossing, PairwiseCov: 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗, 𝑙𝑙) = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙* 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙.  (7) 
In our final step, we aggregate pairwise PairwiseCov to the portfolio level, defined 
as the portfolio-weighted average PairwiseCov across all 45 stock pairs (j, l): 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 = ∑ (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗+𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙)∗𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙)𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 ∑ (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗+𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙)𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 .     (8) 
A large positive realization of InvCov implies a high level of embedded belief-crossing.10  
Our main variable, InvCov, exhibits some time-series persistence. For example, for 
the closed-end fund sample, the autocorrelation in InvCov is 37.6%. Almost all of the 
time-series variation in InvCov comes from changes in analyst forecasts as fund holdings 
are stable over time. More specifically, the correlation between InvCov and an alternative 
measure of InvCov using fund holdings in the previous quarter is 97.1%. For comparison, 
the correlation between InvCov and an alternative measure of InvCov using analyst 
forecasts from the previous quarter is 43.5%. 
 
3.2.2 Disagreement and Crossing – M&As 
The construction of our embedded belief-crossing variable is similar for M&As. For a 
given M&A, we compute the price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion for both the acquirer 
and the target, winsorized at the 99th percentile. We compute Disagreement as the average 
dispersion across the acquirer and the target, weighted by the acquirer’s and the target’s 
market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement. We draw from the list of 
brokerage houses that cover both the acquirer and the target prior to the M&A 
announcement date and compute the Spearman rank correlation in earnings forecasts 
                                                          
10 Note that the portfolio average InvCov in equation (8) does not necessarily equal the product of the 
portfolio average Disagreement with the portfolio average Crossing, as Disagreement and Crossing may be 
correlated across stock pairs. We have also worked with an alternative specification of PairwiseCov, in 
which Disagreement is defined as the product of the two dispersions, rather than the weighted average. The 
results are by and large unchanged. 
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between the acquirer and the target, multiplied by negative one, Crossing. Our main 
independent variable, InvCov, is the interaction of Disagreement with Crossing. 
 
3.2.3 Disagreement – Conglomerates 
As in the previous settings, we rely on price-scaled earnings forecast dispersions to 
approximate investor disagreement for conglomerates. We first focus on single-segment 
firms that are in the same size tercile as the conglomerate to compute the average forecast 
dispersion for each two-digit SIC-code industry as of t (we again winsorize Dispersion at 
the 99th percentile.) We then compute Disagreementi,t as the sales-weighted average 
industry-level dispersion across all segments in which conglomerate i operates as of year 
t. 11  Given that analysts/brokerages do not issue industry-level forecasts, we cannot 
compute belief-crossing for conglomerates. The conglomerates setting therefore only 
produces indirect evidence of our here proposed mechanism. 
 
4. Main Results 
In the Online Appendix, we provide a stylized model to formalize our intuition that in 
the presence of belief crossing the whole is valued at less than the sum of its parts. The 
central prediction of the model is that short-sale constraints coupled with embedded belief 
crossing indeed leads to a discount in the portfolio value relative to the sum of its 
component values. In this section, we test this prediction for CEFs.  
In particular, we estimate a pooled OLS regression on our CEF sample with either 
fund fixed effects or with both fund and year-quarter fixed effects. The dependent variable 
is the CEF premium (%) measured at a quarterly frequency. A negative coefficient thus 
indicates an increase in the CEF discount. The independent variables include InvCov and 
the following set of controls: Inverse Price, Dividend Yield, Liquidity Ratio, Expense 
Ratio, Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Excess Skewness. We explain the construction 
of our control variables in Table A1. For ease of interpretation, all independent variables 
                                                          
11 Recall that, when calculating Premiumi,t, we use information for June of calendar year t to compute the 
market value of equity and use accounting data from fiscal year t-1 to compute the book value of equity. 
To line up the timing of our dependent and independent variables, earnings forecasts used to construct 
Disagreementi,t are for annual earnings of fiscal year t-1 (which must be reported by June of year t). 
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in our regression analysis are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. T-statistics 
are based on standard errors clustered by both fund and year-quarter. 
Table 2 presents the results. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient estimate 
for InvCov is -0.552 (t-statistic = -2.80) if we only include fund fixed effects or -0.491 (t-
statistic = -2.69) if we include both fund and year-quarter fixed effects. These estimates 
imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in InvCov leads to a 0.49% to 0.55% increase 
in the CEF discount. These are sizable changes, as the average CEF discount in our 
sample is 4.3%.  
For our control variables, we obtain a negative estimate for InversePriceneg, which 
suggests that prices are further away from NAVs for low-priced CEFs, perhaps, as these 
CEFs face greater limits to arbitrage (Pontiff 1996). The positive estimate for Liquidity 
Ratio suggests that CEFs trade at more of a premium (or less of a discount) if shares of 
CEFs are more liquid than those of the corresponding underlying assets, which is 
consistent with Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton (2008). 
In our main regression specification, we do not control for investor sentiment, which 
is known to be associated with the average closed-end fund discount (e.g., Lee, Shleifer 
and Thaler 1991). This is because controlling for year-quarter fixed effects already 
accounts for market-wide investor sentiment. In robustness tests, we re-estimate our 
regression equation with fund fixed effects only, but also include either the Conference 
Board Consumer Confidence Index, the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006) or the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index (Baker 
and Wurgler 2006). We also include interaction terms between the sentiment measure and 
measures of costs of arbitrage: the closed-end fund portfolio-weighted average market 
capitalization, the portfolio-weighted average institutional ownership, and the portfolio-
weighted average idiosyncratic volatility. As presented in Online Appendix Table A1, 
controlling for sentiment has almost no effect on the coefficient estimate for InvCov. 
 
4.1 The Role of Short-Sale Constraints 
Our evidence to this point, while highly suggestive of embedded belief crossing having an 
effect on asset prices, is not free of alternative interpretations as one could argue that 
parts of our results suffer from omitted variable concerns.  
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Our first attempt to establish that it is truly embedded belief crossing per se that 
generates at least parts of our findings comes from examining whether our findings 
moderate with short-sale constraints. Based on our framework, the embedded belief-
crossing effect should strengthen with the degree to which stocks are short-sale 
constrained. To test this prediction, we approximate short-sale constraints via the 
interaction of short interest and one minus the fraction of shares held by institutions. 
Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005) suggest that stocks are short-sale constrained when 
demand to short stocks is high while the supply of lendable shares is low. Asquith et al. 
(2005) use short interest as a proxy for demand and one minus the fraction of shares held 
by institutions as a proxy for limited supply. Motivated by prior studies (e.g., Hong, Lim 
and Stein 2000), to ensure that institutional ownership does not effectively capture firm 
size, we orthogonalize institutional ownership with respect to market capitalization by 
estimating cross-sectional regressions of the fractions of shares held by institutions on the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization and by saving the residuals. We then interact 
short interest with one minus residual institutional ownership. Our second (perhaps 
cleaner) proxy for short-sale constraints is the average daily lending fee (from Markit) 
across the top ten stocks in a given fund/year-quarter. High lending fees are indicative of 
high short-sale costs and high short-sale constraints.  
For each fund/year-quarter, we sort our top-ten stock pairs based on their average 
stock-pair level short-sale constraint. We then compute InvCov separately for the stock 
pairs that are in the top half based on their short-sale constraint, High Constraint InvCov, 
and for the stock pairs that are in the bottom half based on their short-sale constraint, 
Low Constraint InvCov. In our framework, embedded belief crossing should impact prices 
only if underlying assets are short-sale constrained. High Constraint InvCov should thus 
have much stronger explanatory power than Low Constraint InvCov. 
Table 3 reports the results when replacing InvCov with High Constraint InvCov 
and Low Constraint InvCov. Consistent with our prediction, we find that for both our 
short-sale constraint proxies High Constraint InvCov strongly associates with CEF 
discounts while Low Constraint InvCov does not. 
 
4.2 Broker Mergers and Closures 
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Our second attempt to establish that it is truly the mechanism of offsetting disagreement 
that generates at least parts of our findings is a difference-in-differences-type analysis 
around broker closures. Broker closures cause a drop in analyst coverage, which, in turn, 
generally lead to a sizeable drop in embedded belief crossing. In particular, we find that 
CEFs whose top-ten holdings are affected by a drop in analyst coverage due to a broker 
closure experience a drop in InvCov of 0.016 from the quarter prior to the broker closure 
to the quarter after such broker closure. To put this drop in perspective, the standard 
deviation of InvCov in our full CEF sample is 0.014. 
 In Table 4, we assess whether this plausibly exogenous drop in InvCov comes with 
a rise in the CEF premium. For each broker merger-closure in our sample period, we 
consider all CEFs in the two quarters surrounding the closure (Column (1)). In Column 
(2), we consider the surrounding four quarters. The observations here are thus at a broker 
closure/CEF/year-quarter level. We construct AffectedGroup, which equals one if a 
CEF’s top-ten holdings are affected by a broker closure, and zero otherwise, and Post, 
which equals one after a broker closure, and zero otherwise. We then estimate a regression 
equation of CEF premium on AffectedGroup, Post, AffectedGroup * Post and the same 
set of controls as in our main regression equation. We include fund and broker 
merger/closure event fixed effects and we cluster our standard errors by both fund and 
broker merger/closure. 
 As reported in Table 4, across all columns, the estimate for AffectedGroup * Post 
is positive and significant. The estimate ranges from 0.519 (t-statistic = 1.86) to 0.643 (t-
statistic = 2.28), suggesting that the drop in belief crossing around broker closures is 
accompanied by a rise in CEF prices relative to their NAVs of 52bps to 64bps. 
 
4.3 Belief Crossing and Future Fund Returns 
Prior research generally assumes that the average investor belief is closer to the 
fundamental value than the beliefs of the most optimistic investors (e.g., Diether, Malloy 
and Scherbina 2002). If short-sale constraints are binding, stocks with higher investor 
disagreement therefore tend to be overpriced and experience lower future returns. Applied 
to our setting, since embedded belief-crossing reduces investor disagreement, CEFs with 
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high embedded belief-crossing should bring not only lower prices but also higher future 
returns compared with funds that have low embedded belief-crossing.  
In Column 1 of Online Appendix Table A2, we estimate pooled OLS regressions of 
CEF returns (four-factor adjusted) in the following year on the same set of independent 
variables as in the discount regressions, as well as time-fixed effects. We find that CEFs 
with high embedded belief-crossing indeed have higher subsequent returns compared with 
funds that have low embedded belief-crossing. In particular, a one-standard deviation 
increase in belief-crossing forecasts 43.8 bps higher four-factor fund alphas (t-statistic 
=1.81) over the ensuing year.  
 
5. Other Settings and Additional Analyses 
In our next set of analyses, we examine whether our mechanism extends to ETFs and the 
corporate sector, in particular M&As and conglomerates. To preview, while not as clean 
of a setting as CEFs, the results from this section are at the very least consistent with 
our framework and, when considered jointly with the CEF, suggest that embedded belief-
crossing and short-sale constraints are important forces. 
 
5.1 Exchange-Traded Funds 
As noted above, ETFs have much smaller discounts compared with CEFs due to the 
presence of authorized participants, who can create and redeem large blocks of an ETF’s 
underlying assets should the value of the underlying assets diverge too much from the 
value of the overall fund. This lowers the power of our analysis. To assess whether 
embedded belief crossing nevertheless shows up in ETFs, we estimate the same pooled 
OLS regression as with CEFs on our sample of ETFs but replace the CEF premium (%) 
variable with the ETF premium (bps) variable.  
The results are reported in Table 5. Consistent with embedded belief crossing 
helping explain ETF discounts, we obtain a coefficient estimate for InvCov of -1.465 (t-
statistic = -2.24), indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in InvCov leads to a 
1.5bp increase in the ETF discount. Compared with the median ETF discount of 2bps in 
our sample, such a rise essentially translates into a doubling of the ETF discount.  
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We conduct two additional sets of analyses regarding ETFs. First, as with CEFs, 
we compute for each ETF in each quarter, two measures of InvCov: one for the stock 
pairs that are in the top half based on their short-sale constraint, High Constraint InvCov 
and another for the stock pairs that are in the bottom half based on their short-sale 
constraint, Low Constraint InvCov. The results are shown in Table 6. Consistent with 
our prediction, High Constraint InvCov strongly associates with ETF discounts, while 
Low Constraint InvCov does not. 
 As noted above, ETFs have much smaller discounts compared with CEFs due to 
the presence of authorized participants, who can create and redeem large blocks of an 
ETF’s underlying assets should the value of the underlying assets diverge too much from 
the value of the overall fund. In our second set of additional analysts, we gauge the extent 
that authorized participants exploit discrepancies tied to changes in embedded belief-
crossing. To illustrate, consider an increase in InvCov, which then leads to an increase in 
the fund discount. Authorized participants should buy ETF shares in the secondary 
market, redeem those shares, and sell the underlying portfolio to reap a sure profit. This 
mechanism translates to a flow out of the ETF. In other words, ∆InvCov should negatively 
affect ETF flows. 
 To test this prediction, we re-estimate the ETF premium regression, but replace 
the dependent variable with the average monthly percentage flow in the corresponding 
quarter. We also first-difference our independent variables to reflect the fact that ETF 
flows respond to the change in, rather than the level of, embedded belief-crossing. We 
include year-quarter-fixed effects. We no longer include fund-fixed effects since all of our 
variables are now first-differenced. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by 
both fund and year-quarter. 
 The results are presented in Online Appendix Table A3. We find that the 
coefficient estimate for ∆InvCov is -0.380 (t-statistic = -3.05), suggesting that a one-
standard-deviation increase in ∆InvCov leads to a 0.38% increase in monthly outflows. 
For reference, the average monthly ETF flow in our sample is 1.6%. These results indicate 
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that authorized participants indeed redeem blocks of ETF shares in response to an ETF’s 
trading at a discount due to changes in embedded belief-crossing.12 
 
5.2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
We next extend our tests to the corporate sector. We begin with M&As. To test whether 
combined announcement day returns decrease with embedded belief-crossing, we estimate 
a pooled OLS regression with year fixed effects across the 405 M&A events that meet our 
data requirements. The dependent variable is the combined announcement day return (in 
%). The combined announcement day return of an acquirer and a target can be seen as 
partly reflecting the difference between the value of the joint firm (i.e., “the portfolio 
value”) and the sum of the values of the acquirer and target operating separately (i.e., 
“the sum of the individual component values”). If embedded belief-crossing lowers the 
value of the whole relative to the sum of its parts, embedded belief-crossing between an 
acquirer and a target should lower the combined announcement day return. The 
independent variables include InvCov and various controls as described in Table A1. T-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered by year.    
Table 7 Column 3, which reports our results when including our full set of controls, 
shows that the coefficient estimate for InvCov is -1.713 (t-statistic = -4.72). This estimate 
suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in InvCov comes with a 1.713% lower 
combined announcement day return, which is consistent with our conjecture that belief 
crossing lowers the value of the whole relative to the sum of its parts even in M&As. 
 One alternative interpretation is that M&As for which beliefs cross—i.e., M&As 
for which the investor group that likes the acquirer (target) also happens to dislike the 
target (acquirer)—tend to create low synergies on average; hence, our observed low 
combined announcement day returns.  
To assess the validity of this alternative interpretation, we conduct the following 
two tests. First, to the extent that synergies are reflected in subsequent operating 
performance, M&As with higher belief-crossing should produce worse operating 
                                                          
12 While the evidence in this subsection suggests that authorized participants help make markets more 
efficient by trading against discounts that arise from embedded belief crossing effects, Online Appendix 
Table A4 provides an example where authorized participants – through their actions – appear to destabilize 
prices.  
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performance going forward. We experiment with a number of operating performance 
measures within a regression framework: ROA, return on equity (ROE), net profit margin, 
and sales growth. As shown in Online Appendix Table A5, our crossing variable does not 
associate with any of these operating performance measures in the five years after an 
M&A. (The results are nearly identical if we instead look at operating performance in the 
next 10 or 15 years.) 
In our second test, we exploit variation in long-run stock returns. Within our 
framework, M&As with high embedded belief-crossing trade at a relative discount. M&As 
with high embedded belief-crossing may therefore experience not only lower combined 
announcement day returns but also higher future returns compared with M&As that have 
low belief-crossing. The synergy story does not share this prediction. 
Consistent with the embedded belief-crossing framework, Column (2) of Online 
Appendix Table A2 shows that an increase in belief-crossing between an acquirer and a 
target strongly and positively forecasts post-M&A stock returns: a one-standard-deviation 
increase in belief-crossing predicts nearly 3.4% higher abnormal returns (t-statistic = 2.37) 
in the year following an M&A. 
 
5.3 Conglomerates 
For conglomerate firms, we follow prior studies (e.g., Lang and Stulz 1994) and estimate 
both a pooled OLS regression with year fixed effects and a Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regression. The dependent variable is the conglomerate firm discount computed on an 
annual basis. The independent variable of primary interest is the sales-weighted average 
industry disagreement. Since brokerages do not issue forecasts for individual sectors, we 
are unable to compute Crossing and InvCov in this setting. The controls are as described 
in Table A1. 
If embedded belief-crossing lowers the value of the whole relative to the sum of its 
parts, disagreement, which positively relates to embedded belief-crossing, should increase 
the diversification discount. Consistent with this prediction, Table 8 shows that the 
coefficient estimate for Disagreement is -0.043 (t-statistic = -2.92) in the pooled OLS 
setting; in the Fama-MacBeth setting, the estimate is -0.069 (t-statistic = -6.10). These 
estimates indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in Disagreement is associated 
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with a 4.3% to 6.9% increase in the conglomerate firm discount. Relative to the average 
conglomerate discount of 14.9% in our sample, these estimated increases are economically 
substantial. 
 
5.4 Additional Analyses 
In our final set of tests, we consider whether some managers are aware of the effect of 
embedded belief crossing and respond accordingly. We do so first for CEFs and ETFs and 
then for M&As.  
 Part of the “CEF puzzle” is that CEFs begin their lives trading at premia even 
though existing CEFs generally trade at significant discounts. Subsequently and fairly 
rapidly, such newly issued CEFs start trading at steep discounts also. Our framework 
cannot account for the phenomenon that CEFs begin their lives trading at premia. There 
are both behavioral (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 1991) and rational explanations (Cherkes, 
Sagi, and Stanton 2008; Ross 2009) for this pattern. Our framework does predict though 
that to the extent that fund companies are aware of the negative effect of embedded belief 
crossing on portfolio value, managers initiating a CEF should construct portfolios with 
low levels of embedded belief crossing to maximize the proceeds from the IPO. Further, 
should managers find it difficult to construct such portfolios, they may forego the IPO 
altogether. 
To test this idea, we compute, for each two-digit SIC-code industry in each year-
quarter, the average level of embedded belief crossing across all stock pairs within that 
industry. We then examine whether the creation of CEFs and ETFs specializing in that 
industry is tied to the corresponding level of belief crossing. We estimate a pooled logit 
regression, where the dependent variable equals one if the industry/year-quarter has at 
least one CEF or ETF IPO specializing in that industry, and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables include embedded belief crossing, market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio and past one-year returns, all at the industry/year-quarter level. 
Our evidence, shown in Online Appendix Table A6, reveals that higher industry-
average belief crossing, indeed, forecasts fewer CEF/ETF IPOs. Specifically, our estimate 
for InvCov is -0.146 (t-statistic = -2.80). This implies that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in industry-average belief crossing lowers the likelihood of having at least one 
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CEF/ETF initiation by 3.3%, representing a 31.1% drop relative to the unconditional 
likelihood.  
If at least some managers are aware of the negative effect of embedded belief 
crossing and respond accordingly, why then do we observe variation in the level of 
embedded belief crossing? Our answer is that all funds in our sample have investment 
themes. Thus, while it may be possible for a fund management company to market-time 
and only launch a fund if stocks in the corresponding theme have low levels of belief 
crossing with each other, once a fund is launched, managers have limited discretion in 
responding to changes in belief crossing while staying invested in stocks that fit the fund’s 
overall theme. We believe that this can induce variation in belief crossing across funds 
and over time that is not tied to agency problems or weak advertising. 
 We conduct a similar experiment for M&As. M&As occur for a variety of reasons 
and firm managers may decide to conduct an M&A even if the level of embedded belief 
crossing is high. Still, on the margin, to the extent that firm managers recognize the 
negative valuation effect of embedded belief crossing, the likelihood of having an M&A 
between a firm pair should decrease with the level of embedded belief crossing. We conduct 
the following experiment to test this idea: For each M&A announcement in our sample, 
we construct a set of counterfactual firm pairs that are similar to the actual M&A pair 
along an array of observable firm characteristics, but that involve firms that did not 
engage in an M&A. Specifically, for each firm involved in an M&A, we identify ten pseudo 
acquirers and ten pseudo targets that are the closest to the actual acquirer and target 
based on the propensity score matching approach utilizing firm size, book-to-market ratio, 
leverage, operating cash flow, ROA, G-index, idiosyncratic volatility and skewness. 
In our first regression specification, we include the actual acquirer/target pair and 
also individually match the actual acquirer with each of the ten pseudo targets, resulting 
in one actual acquirer/target pair and ten counterfactual firm pairs. In our second 
regression specification, we reverse the matching and individually match the actual target 
with each of the ten pseudo acquirers, resulting again in one actual acquirer/target pair 
and ten counterfactual firm pairs. In our third regression specification, we include the 20 
counterfactual firm pairs from above and, in addition, match each of the ten pseudo 
acquirers with each of the ten pseudo targets. Out of the resulting 120 pseudo pairs, we 
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select the ten pseudo pairs whose pair level average firm characteristics are closest to the 
pair level average firm characteristics of the actual acquirer/target pair.13 
We then estimate a logit regression, where the dependent variable equals one for 
actual M&A pairs, and zero for counterfactual firm pairs. The independent variables are 
the same as in the combined-announcement day-return regression, but are now averaged 
to the firm-pair level (both actual and pseudo). As shown in Online Appendix Table A7, 
we find that across all three regression specifications, high embedded belief crossing 
between firm pairs, indeed, lowers the probability of such firms merging. For example, 
our third regression specification reported in Column 3 produces a coefficient estimate for 
InvCov of -0.132 (t-statistic = -4.13). This estimate suggests that a one-standard-
deviation increase in embedded belief crossing lowers the likelihood of observing an M&A 
by nearly 3%, representing a 32.6% drop relative to the unconditional likelihood of an 
M&A. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In sum, our paper notes that investor beliefs frequently cross, which can cause the whole 
to trade at a discount relative to the sum of its parts. Utilizing four seemingly unrelated 
settings: CEFs, ETFs, M&As and conglomerates, we provide evidence that belief crossing 
is a broad and general force that helps explain a wide set of patterns across a full spectrum 
of securities. In addition to introducing a new construct, our paper also contributes to the 
behavioral finance literature by providing relatively clean evidence for the relevance of 
disagreement models and short-sale constraints in explaining asset prices. 
For future research, investor belief-crossing not only helps explain the pricing of 
CEFs, ETFs, M&As and conglomerates, but that the implications of our argument are 
much broader and pertinent to any situation that involves portfolios of companies or large 
companies operating in multiple segments. For instance, our argument implies that, in 
the presence of strong belief-crossing, managers are better off “unbundling” their large 
portfolios into smaller, more sharply focused portfolios that have strong appeal among 
“niche investor groups.” Such a conversion to smaller, more sharply focused portfolios 
                                                          
13 Specifically, the ones that have the closest propensity score utilizing firm size, book-to-market ratio, 
leverage, operating cash flow, ROA, G-index, idiosyncratic volatility and skewness 
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would be somewhat akin to the shift in the cable industry from large cable packages 
(sometimes containing more than two hundred TV channels) to significantly smaller and 
more customized cable packages (Popper, 2015).
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Table A1. Variable Description. 
 
Variable  Description 
 
Panel A: Closed-End Funds (CEFs) 
 
CEF Premium A CEF’s market price minus its NAV, divided by its NAV.  
Disagreement The portfolio-weighted average price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion of the top ten stocks held by a CEF. 
 
Crossing We compute the Spearman rank correlation between earnings forecasts for each top-ten stock pair. Crossing 
is the portfolio-weighted average of these correlations, multiplied by negative one. 
 
InvCov  For each top-ten stock pair, we compute the Spearman rank correlation between earnings forecasts, 
multiplied by their respective forecast dispersions. InvCov is the portfolio-weighted average of these 
interactions, multiplied by negative one. 
 
Inverse Price (Pos) [(Neg)] The inverse of a CEF’s lagged market price if the CEF trades at a premium [discount], and zero otherwise.  
 
Dividend Yield (Pos) [(Neg)] The sum of the dividends paid by a CEF over the past one year divided by the CEF’s lagged market price 
if the CEF trades at a premium [discount], and zero otherwise.  
 
Liquidity Ratio A CEF’s one-month turnover, divided by the portfolio-weighted average one-month turnover of the stocks 
held by the CEF. If the stock is listed on NASDAQ, we divide the number of shares traded by two. 
 
Expense Ratio A CEF’s expense ratio. 
 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility The difference between the idiosyncratic volatility of a CEF and the portfolio-weighted average idiosyncratic 
volatility of the stocks held by the CEF. Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated based on residuals from the 
Fama-French Three-Factor model over a one-month return window using daily returns. 
 
Excess Skewness The difference between the return skewness of a CEF and the portfolio-weighted average return skewness of 
the stocks held by the CEF. Return skewness is calculated as 𝐷𝐷 = 122∑ (rt−µ)322t=1σ�3 , where s is calculated using 
daily returns over a one-month return window, µ is the mean return, and σ�3 is the cube of the return 
standard deviation. 
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Table A1. Continued. 
 
Variable  Description 
 
Panel B: Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) 
 
ETF Premium An ETF’s market price minus its NAV, divided by its NAV. 
 
Disagreement The portfolio-weighted average price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion of the top ten stocks held by an 
ETF. 
 
Crossing  We compute the Spearman rank correlation between earnings forecasts for each top-ten stock pair. Crossing 
is the portfolio-weighted average of these correlations, multiplied by negative one. 
 
InvCov  For each top-ten stock pair, we compute the Spearman rank correlation between earnings forecasts, 
multiplied by their respective forecast dispersions. InvCov is the portfolio-weighted average of these 
interactions, multiplied by negative one. 
 
Inverse Price (Pos) [(Neg)] The inverse of a CEF’s lagged market price if the CEF trades at a premium [discount], and zero otherwise.  
 
Dividend Yield (Pos) [(Neg)] The sum of the dividends paid by a CEF over the past one year divided by the CEF’s lagged market price 
if the CEF trades at a premium [discount], and zero otherwise.  
 
Liquidity Ratio An ETF’s one-month turnover, divided by the portfolio-weighted average one-month turnover of the stocks 
held by the ETF. If a stock is listed on NASDAQ, we divide the number of shares traded by two. 
 
Expense Ratio An ETF’s expense ratio. 
 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility The difference between the idiosyncratic volatility of an ETF and the portfolio-weighted average 
idiosyncratic volatility of the stocks held by the ETF. Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated based on residuals 
from the Fama-French Three-Factor model over a one-month return window using daily returns. 
 
Excess Skewness The difference between the return skewness of an ETF and the portfolio-weighted average return skewness 
of the stocks held by the ETF. Return skewness is calculated as 𝐷𝐷 = 122∑ (rt−µ)322t=1σ�3 , where s is calculated using 
daily returns over a one-month return window, µ is the mean return, and σ�3 is the cube of the return 
standard deviation. 
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Table A1. Continued. 
 
Variable  Description 
 
Panel C: Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Combined Announcement Day 
Return 
The average cumulative abnormal return [-1,+1] across an acquirer and a target where t=0 is the day (or 
the ensuing trading day) of an M&A announcement, weighted by the acquirer’s and target’s market 
capitalization in the month prior to the announcement.  
Acquirer (Target) Announcement 
Day Return 
The cumulative abnormal return [-1,+1] for an acquirer (a target) where t=0 is the day (or the ensuing 
trading day) of an M&A announcement. 
 
Disagreement The average earnings forecast dispersion (scaled by price) across an acquirer and a target, weighted by the 
acquirer’s and target’s market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement. 
 
Crossing The Spearman rank correlation between brokerage earnings forecasts issued for an acquirer and those issued 
for a target, multiplied by negative one. 
 
InvCov The Spearman rank correlation between brokerage earnings forecasts issued for an acquirer and those issued 
for a target, multiplied by the respective earnings forecast dispersions, multiplied by negative one. 
 
Acquirer (Target) 
Market Capitalization 
An acquirer’s (a target’s) market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement. 
 
Acquirer (Target) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
An acquirer’s (a target’s) market-to-book ratio. 
 
 
Acquirer (Target) ROA An acquirer’s (a target’s) ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets. 
 
Acquirer (Target) Leverage An acquirer’s (a target’s) ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
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Table A1. Continued. 
 
Variable  Description 
 
Acquirer (Target) Operating Cash 
Flow 
An acquirer’s (a target’s) ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. 
 
 
Acquirer (Target) ATP index ATP index is an anti-takeover provision index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers 
and charter amendments. The index runs from 0 through 6 based on the number of these provisions that a 
company adopts in a given year (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009). 
 
Tender Offer Variable that equals one if a tender offer is made and zero otherwise. 
 
Hostile Offer Variable that equals one if a takeover is considered hostile and zero otherwise. 
 
Competing Offer Variable that equals one if there are multiple offers made by various companies and zero otherwise. 
 
Cash Only Variable that equals one if an acquirer uses cash only to purchase a target and zero otherwise. 
 
Stock Only Variable that equals one if an acquirer uses stocks only to purchase a target and zero otherwise. 
 
Same Industry Same industry is a dummy variable that equals one if acquirer and target companies are in the same two-
digit SIC codes and zero otherwise. 
 
Combined Idiosyncratic Volatility  The average idiosyncratic volatility across an acquirer and a target, weighted by the acquirer’s and target’s 
market capitalization in the month prior to an announcement. Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated based on 
residuals from the Fama-French Three-Factor model over a one-month return window using daily returns. 
 
Combined Skewness The average return skewness across an acquirer and a target, weighted by the acquirer’s and target’s market 
capitalization in the month prior to an announcement. Return skewness is calculated as s =
112∑ (𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡−𝜇𝜇)312𝑡𝑡=1𝜎𝜎�2 , 
where s is calculated using monthly returns over a one-year return window, μ is the mean return, and σ̂3 is 
the cube of the return standard deviation. 
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Table A1. Continued. 
 
Variable  Description 
 
Panel D: Conglomerates 
 
Diversification Premium The difference between a conglomerate’s market-to-book ratio (MB) and its imputed MB, divided by the 
conglomerate’s imputed MB. For each two-digit-SIC code industry in which the conglomerate operates, we 
calculate the average MB across all single-segment firms that are in the same size tercile as the conglomerate. 
The imputed MB is the sales-weighted average of those industry MBs.  
 
Disagreement For each two-digit SIC code in which a conglomerate operates, we calculate the average price-scaled earnings 
forecast dispersion across all single-segment firms that are in the same size tercile as the conglomerate. 
Disagreement is the sales-weighted average of those industry dispersions. 
 
Total Assets A conglomerate’s total assets.  
 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  
 
Profitability  The ratio of earnings before interest and tax to net revenue.  
 
Investment Ratio The ratio of capital expenditures to net revenue. 
 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility The difference between the idiosyncratic volatility of a conglomerate and its imputed idiosyncratic volatility. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated based on residuals from the Fama-French Three-Factor model over a 
one-year return window using monthly returns. For each two-digit SIC-code industry in which a 
conglomerate operates, we compute the average idiosyncratic volatility across all single-segment firms that 
are in the same size tercile as the conglomerate. The imputed idiosyncratic volatility is the sales-weighted 
average of those industry volatilities. 
 
Excess Skewness The difference between the return skewness of a conglomerate and its imputed return skewness. Return 
skewness is calculated as 𝐷𝐷 = 112∑ (rt−µ)312t=1σ�3 , where s is calculated using monthly returns over a one-year return 
window, µ is the mean return, and σ�3 is the cube of the return standard deviation. For each two-digit SIC-
code industry in which the conglomerate operates, we compute the average skewness across all single-segment 
firms that are in the same size tercile as the conglomerate. The imputed return skewness is the sales-weighted 
average industry skewness. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for our samples of closed-end funds (CEFs), exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs), mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and conglomerates. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the 
pooled sample of CEF observations. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of ETF 
observations. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of M&A observations. Panel D 
reports descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of conglomerate observations. All variables are described 
in Table A1. 
 
 N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th 
Panel A: Closed-End Funds 
 
 CEF Premium 1,906 -0.043 0.150 -0.124 -0.090 -0.020 
 InvCov (*100) 1,906 -0.002 0.014 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 
 Disagreement 1,906 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 Crossing 1,906 -0.018 0.145 -0.075 -0.014 0.041 
 Inverse Price 1,906 0.097 0.070 0.056 0.076 0.110 
 Dividend Yield 1,906 0.067 0.046 0.037 0.074 0.095 
 Liquidity Ratio 1,906 3.422 3.283 1.724 2.543 4.038 
 Expense Ratio 1,906 1.216 0.544 0.970 1.140 1.380 
 Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 1,906 -0.003 0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 
 Excess Skewness 1,906 -0.135 0.604 -0.480 -0.109 0.227 
Panel B: Exchange-Traded Funds 
 
 ETF Premium (bps) 4,310 -0.471 36.147 -8.028 -1.957 7.995 
 InvCov (*100) 4,310 -0.010 0.049 -0.011 -0.003 0.020 
 Disagreement 4,310 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 Crossing  4,310 -0.044 0.137 -0.103 -0.037 0.019 
 Inverse Price 4,310 0.033 0.022 0.017 0.027 0.043 
 Dividend Yield 4,310 0.016 0.015 0.007 0.013 0.019 
 Liquidity Ratio 4,310 1.076 2.382 0.263 0.654 1.216 
 Expense Ratio 4,310 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 4,310 -0.005 0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
 Excess Skewness 4,310 -0.070 0.427 -0.313 -0.071 0.164 
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Table 1. Continued. 
 
 N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th 
Panel C: Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 Combined Announcement Day Return 405 0.021 0.070 -0.016 0.011 0.055 
 Acquirer Announcement Day Return 405 -0.013 0.070 -0.049 -0.010 0.017 
 Target Announcement Day Return 405 0.227 0.260 0.093 0.187 0.312 
 InvCov (*100) 405 0.002 0.255 -0.030 0.000 0.025 
 Disagreement 405 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 Crossing  405 -0.019 0.605 -0.500 0.000 0.462 
       
Acquirer Characteristics:       
  Acquirer Market Capitalization 405 27,740 48,391 1,838 6,223 25,489 
  Acquirer Market-to-Book Ratio 405 3.498 3.257 1.624 2.366 4.155 
  Acquirer ROA 405 0.094 0.084 0.041 0.090 0.145 
  Acquirer Leverage 405 0.563 0.217 0.416 0.565 0.717 
  Acquirer Operating Cash Flow 405 0.105 0.078 0.059 0.107 0.153 
  Acquirer ATP Index 405 2.208 1.121 1.889 2.000 3.000 
       
Target Characteristics:       
  Target Market Capitalization 405 2,623 5,105 4,029 9,896 22,340 
  Target Market-to-Book Ratio 405 3.984 2.849 1.489 2.233 3.403 
  Target ROA 405 0.052 0.131 0.015 0.064 0.115 
  Target Leverage 405 0.523 0.251 0.298 0.537 0.724 
  Target Operating Cash Flow 405 0.073 0.115 0.027 0.080 0.135 
  Target ATP Index 405 2.077 1.308 1.581 2.000 2.272 
Panel D: Conglomerates 
 
 Diversification Premium 14,792 -0.149  0.750  -0.577  -0.175  0.244  
 Disagreement 14,792 0.008  0.025  0.001  0.002  0.005  
 Number of Segments 14,792 2.358  0.658  2.000 2.000 3.000 
 Total Assets 14,792 5,809 31,853 93.9 450.6 2,402.1 
 Leverage 14,792 0.193  0.162  0.050  0.172  0.295  
 Profitability  14,792 0.051  0.192  0.028  0.075  0.127  
 Investment Ratio 14,792 0.072  0.108  0.022  0.039  0.073  
 Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 14,792 -0.005  0.066  -0.037  -0.014  0.013  
 Excess Skewness 14,792 -0.012  0.646  -0.427  -0.031  0.379  
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Table 2. Belief Crossing and Closed-End Fund Discounts 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions of quarterly CEF premia on a measure 
of investor disagreement and belief crossing across the CEF’s top-ten holdings. The dependent variable is 
the difference between the CEF’s market price and the CEF’s NAV, divided by the CEF’s NAV [%]. We 
construct InvCov as follows: For each stock pair involving securities of the CEF’s top-ten holdings, we 
compile a list of brokerage houses that cover both firms and we compute the Spearman rank correlation in 
earnings forecasts between these two firms; we also compute the forecast dispersion for each of the two 
firms. PairwiseCov is the product of the Spearman rank correlation and the average forecast dispersion. We 
aggregate PairwiseCov to InvCov as the portfolio-weighted average PairwiseCov across all stock pairs, 
multiplied by negative one. A large positive realization of InvCov suggests a high level of belief crossing. 
We describe how we construct the remaining independent variables in Appendix A1. All independent 
variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. We include fund-fixed effects in Column (1) 
and both fund- and year-quarter-fixed effects in Column (2). T-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
are based on standard errors clustered by both fund and year-quarter. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
   
InvCov -0.552*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.491*** 
(-2.69) 
Disagreement 0.180 
(0.36) 
0.388 
(0.91) 
Crossing 0.105 
(0.58) 
0.034 
(0.19) 
Inverse Pricepos -1.693 
(-1.08) 
-1.017 
(-0.59) 
Inverse Priceneg -5.500*** 
(-3.93) 
-4.712*** 
(-2.61) 
Dividend Yieldpos 1.820* 
(1.70) 
1.554 
(1.54) 
Dividend Yieldneg -0.481 
(-1.04) 
-0.130 
(-0.26) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.902 
(1.60) 
1.372*** 
(2.70) 
Expense Ratio 0.910 
(1.05) 
0.925 
(1.07) 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.328 
(0.48) 
0.526 
(0.75) 
Excess Skewness 0.090 
(0.68) 
0.135 
(1.23) 
   
Fixed Effects Fund Fund and Time 
   
# Obs. 1,906 1,906 
Adj. R2 0.828 0.843 
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Table 3. Closed-End Fund Discounts: The Role of Short-Sale Constraints 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions of quarterly CEF premia on the 
interaction of a measure of short-sale constraints and a measure of investor disagreement and belief crossing 
across the CEF’s top-ten holdings. The dependent variable is the difference between the CEF’s market price 
and the CEF’s NAV, divided by the CEF’s NAV [%].We construct Low Constraint InvCov and High 
Constraint InvCov as follows: For each stock pair involving securities of the CEF’s top-ten holdings, we 
compute a measure of short-sale constraints, which, in Columns (1) and (2), is (1-IO)*SI, where IO is 
residual institutional ownership and SI is short interest. In Columns (3) and (4), it is the average daily 
lending fee in the corresponding quarter. Top-half stock pairs fall into the high constraint group; bottom-
half stock pairs fall into the low constraint group. Within each group, for each stock pair, we compile a list 
of brokerage houses that cover both firms and we compute the Spearman rank correlation in earnings 
forecasts between these two firms; we also compute the forecast dispersion for each of the two firms. 
PairwiseCov is the product of the Spearman rank correlation and the average forecast dispersion. We 
aggregate PairwiseCov to Low Constraint InvCov (High Constraint InvCov) as the portfolio-weighted 
average PairwiseCov across all stock pairs in the low constraint group (high constraint group), multiplied 
by negative one. A large positive realization of Low Constraint InvCov (High Constraint InvCov) suggests 
a high level of belief crossing. We describe how we construct the remaining independent variables in 
Appendix A1. All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. We include 
fund-fixed effects in Columns (1) and (3) and both fund- and year-quarter-fixed effects in Columns (2) and 
(4). T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by both fund and 
year-quarter. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  
Interaction of Residual Retail 
Ownership and Short Interest 
 Lending Fees 
 (1) (2) 
 (3) (4) 
      
Low Constraint InvCov -0.229 
(-1.19) 
-0.155 
(-0.69)  
0.126 
(0.82) 
0.060 
(0.32) 
High Constraint InvCov -0.408** 
(-1.97) 
-0.351** 
(-2.03)  
-0.385* 
(-1.81) 
-0.392** 
(-2.05) 
Disagreement 0.489 
(0.90) 
0.628 
(1.30)  
0.188 
(0.40) 
0.409 
(0.98) 
Crossing 0.037 
(0.17) 
-0.104 
(-0.43)  
-0.100 
(-0.34) 
-0.119 
(-0.38) 
Institutional Ownership 0.356 
(0.73) 
0.734 
(1.48)  
  
Short Interest -0.752 
(-1.56) 
-0.780 
(-1.54)  
  
Lending Fee   
 
-0.204 
(-0.75) 
-0.363 
(-1.38) 
Inverse Pricepos -2.206 
(-1.19) 
-1.472 
(-0.74)  
-1.664 
(-1.04) 
-0.951 
(-0.55) 
Inverse Priceneg -5.894*** 
(-3.72) 
-5.221*** 
(-2.65)  
-5.470*** 
(-3.87) 
-4.704*** 
(-2.63) 
Dividend Yieldpos 1.927* 
(1.66) 
1.440 
(1.34)  
1.796* 
(1.65) 
1.453 
(1.43) 
Dividend Yieldneg -0.456 
(-0.95) 
-0.337 
(-0.63)  
-0.429 
(-0.92) 
-0.125 
(-0.26) 
Liquidity Ratio 1.284* 
(1.69) 
1.563*** 
(2.63)  
0.932* 
(1.65) 
1.387*** 
(2.74) 
Expense Ratio 0.801 
(0.93) 
0.838 
(0.98)   
0.774 
(0.90) 
0.808 
(0.93) 
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Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.369 
(0.52) 
0.590 
(0.79)  
0.301 
(0.43) 
0.536 
(0.75) 
Excess Skewness 0.071 
(0.57) 
0.138 
(1.12)  
0.105 
(0.72) 
0.138 
(1.11) 
 
  
 
  
Fixed Effects Fund Fund & Time  Fund Fund & Time 
      
# Obs. 1,906 1,906  1,885 1,885 
Adj. R2 0.794 0.812  0.827 0.842 
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Table 4. Closed-End Fund Discounts: Evidence from Broker Mergers and Closures 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions of quarterly CEF premia on an indicator 
of whether a CEF’s top-ten holdings are affected by a broker merger or closure. The dependent variable is 
the difference between the CEF’s market price and the CEF’s NAV, divided by the CEF’s NAV [%]. For 
each broker merger-closure in our sample period, we consider all CEFs in the two quarters surrounding the 
merger/closure for Column (1) and the four quarters surrounding the merger/closure for Columns (2), 
respectively. AffectedGroup equals one if a CEF’s top-ten holdings are affected by a broker merger-closure, 
and zero otherwise. Post equals one after a broker merger-closure, and zero otherwise. Thus, the observations 
here are at a broker merger-closure/CEF/year-quarter level. We describe how we construct the remaining 
independent variables in Appendix A1. All independent variables are normalized to have a standard 
deviation of one. We include both fund- and event-fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
are based on standard errors clustered by both fund and event. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
Quarters Around Broker Merger or Closure 
 
2 Quarters 
(1) 
4 Quarters 
(2) 
   
AffectedGroup * Post 0.519* 
(1.86) 
0.643** 
(2.28) 
AffectedGroup -0.380* 
(-1.72) 
-0.276 
(-1.20) 
Post -0.327* 
(-1.65) 
-0.368 
(-1.54) 
Disagreement 0.344 
(0.96) 
0.460 
(1.34) 
Crossing -0.100 
(-0.74) 
-0.119 
(-0.78) 
Inverse Pricepos -2.891 
(-1.56) 
-2.902** 
(-2.00) 
Inverse Priceneg -5.431*** 
(-2.82) 
-5.150*** 
(-2.95) 
Dividend Yieldpos 2.770** 
(2.43) 
2.783*** 
(2.87) 
Dividend Yieldneg 0.192 
(0.38) 
0.046 
(0.10) 
Liquidity Ratio 1.073** 
(2.24) 
1.062** 
(2.25) 
Expense Ratio 1.073 
(1.07) 
1.313 
(0.94) 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.769* 
(1.74) 
0.905*** 
(2.79) 
Excess Skewness 0.214 
(1.39) 
0.175 
(1.31) 
   
Fixed Effects Fund and Event Fund and Event 
   
# Obs. 9,948 12,752 
Adj. R2 0.850 0.851 
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Table 5. The Effect of Belief Crossing in Other Settings: Exchange-Traded Funds 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions of quarterly ETF premia on a measure 
of investor disagreement and belief crossing across the ETF’s top-ten holdings. The dependent variable is 
the difference between the ETF’s market price and the ETF’s NAV, divided by the ETF’s NAV [in basis 
point]. We construct InvCov as follows: For each stock pair involving securities of the ETF’s top-ten 
holdings, we compile a list of brokerage houses that cover both firms and we compute the Spearman rank 
correlation in earnings forecasts between these two firms; we also compute the forecast dispersion for each 
of the two firms. PairwiseCov is the product of the Spearman rank correlation and the average forecast 
dispersion. We aggregate PairwiseCov to InvCov as the portfolio-weighted average PairwiseCov across all 
stock pairs, multiplied by negative one. A large positive realization of InvCov suggests a high level of belief 
crossing. We describe how we construct the remaining independent variables in Appendix A1. All 
independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. We include fund-fixed effects in 
Column (1) and both fund- and year-quarter-fixed effects in Column (2). T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by both fund and year-quarter. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
   
InvCov -1.639*** 
(-2.65) 
-1.465** 
(-2.24) 
Disagreement 0.096 
(0.08) 
0.582 
(0.47) 
Crossing 0.105 
(0.58) 
0.034 
(0.19) 
Inverse Pricepos 0.666 
(1.57) 
0.505 
(1.04) 
Inverse Priceneg -5.500*** 
(-3.93) 
-4.712*** 
(-2.61) 
Dividend Yieldpos 8.266*** 
(2.73) 
3.683 
(0.83) 
Dividend Yieldneg -0.481 
(-1.04) 
-0.130 
(-0.26) 
Liquidity Ratio -6.606** 
(-2.15) 
-10.344** 
(-2.02) 
Expense Ratio 0.910 
(1.05) 
0.925 
(1.07) 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.688* 
(1.85) 
1.822 
(1.30) 
Excess Skewness 0.090 
(0.68) 
0.135 
(1.23) 
   
Fixed Effects Fund Fund and Time 
   
# Obs. 4,310 4,310 
Adj. R2 0.337 0.372 
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Table 6. Exchange-Traded Fund Discounts: The Role of Short-Sale Constraints 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions of quarterly ETF premia on the 
interaction of a measure of short-sale constraints and a measure of investor disagreement and belief crossing 
across the ETF’s top-ten holdings. The dependent variable is the difference between the ETF’s market price 
and the ETF’s NAV, divided by the ETF’s NAV [%].We construct Low Constraint InvCov and High 
Constraint InvCov as follows: For each stock pair involving securities of the ETF’s top-ten holdings, we 
compute a measure of short-sale constraints, which, in Columns (1) and (2), is (1-IO)*SI, where IO is 
residual institutional ownership, and SI is short interest. In Columns (3) and (4), it is the average daily 
lending fee in the corresponding quarter. Top-half stock pairs fall into the high constraint group; bottom-
half stock pairs fall into the low constraint group. Within each group, for each stock pair, we compile a list 
of brokerage houses that cover both firms and we compute the Spearman rank correlation in earnings 
forecasts between these two firms; we also compute the forecast dispersion for each of the two firms. 
PairwiseCov is the product of the Spearman rank correlation and the average forecast dispersion. We 
aggregate PairwiseCov to Low Constraint InvCov (High Constraint InvCov) as the portfolio-weighted 
average PairwiseCov across all stock pairs in the low constraint group (high constraint group), multiplied 
by negative one. A large positive realization of Low Constraint InvCov (High Constraint InvCov) suggests 
a high level of belief crossing. We describe how we construct the remaining independent variables in 
Appendix A1. All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. We include 
fund-fixed effects in Columns (1) and (3) and both fund- and year-quarter-fixed effects in Columns (2) and 
(4). T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by both fund and 
year-quarter. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  
Interaction of Residual Retail 
Ownership and Short Interest  
 Lending Fees 
 (1) (2) 
 (3) (4) 
Low Constraint InvCov 0.889 
(0.38) 
1.599 
(0.60) 
 
-0.170 
(-0.81) 
-0.172 
(-0.83) 
High Constraint InvCov -2.686*** 
(-4.57) 
-2.661*** 
(-3.78) 
 
-1.437** 
(-2.07) 
-1.473** 
(-2.05) 
Disagreement 0.020 
(0.02) 
0.413 
(0.35) 
 
0.395 
(1.51) 
0.470** 
(1.99) 
Crossing 0.535 
(1.08) 
0.335 
(0.61) 
 
0.503** 
(2.48) 
0.450** 
(2.18) 
Institutional Ownership 0.675 
(0.53) 
-0.249 
(-0.19) 
 
  
Short Interest 1.637* 
(1.65) 
2.929** 
(2.05) 
 
  
Lending Fees    -0.068 
(-0.56) 
-0.070 
(-0.65) 
Inverse Pricepos 8.208*** 
(2.71) 
3.537 
(0.79) 
 
4.614*** 
(9.98) 
4.089*** 
(4.47) 
Inverse Priceneg -6.748** 
(-2.19) 
-10.577** 
(-2.05) 
 
-4.315*** 
(-5.91) 
-4.420*** 
(-3.93) 
Dividend Yieldpos 1.629* 
(1.79) 
1.316 
(1.27) 
 
1.486 *** 
(4.66) 
1.410*** 
(4.36) 
Dividend Yieldneg -3.642*** 
(-3.24) 
-3.526*** 
(-3.30) 
 
-1.255*** 
(-4.91) 
-1.184*** 
(-4.54) 
Liquidity Ratio -2.253 
(-1.26) 
-2.061 
(-1.24) 
 
-0.348 
(-0.98) 
-0.199 
(-0.70) 
Expense Ratio -1.314 
(-0.57) 
-1.645 
(-0.63) 
 
0.622 
(0.77) 
0.598 
(0.80) 
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Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.235 
(-0.35) 
0.569 
(0.63) 
 
0.218 
(1.05) 
0.116 
(0.41) 
Excess Skewness 1.879 
(0.53) 
2.268 
(0.62) 
 
0.080 
(0.42) 
0.086 
(0.46) 
      
Fixed Effects Fund Fund and Time  Fund Fund and Time 
      
# Obs. 4,310 4,310  4,301 4,301 
Adj. R2 0.338 0.374  0.631 0.659 
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Table 7. The Effect of Belief Crossing in Other Settings: Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of combined M&A announcement day returns on a 
measure of investor disagreement and belief crossing about the acquirer and the target. The dependent 
variable is the average cumulative abnormal return [-1,+1] across the acquirer and the target where t=0 is 
the day (or the ensuing trading day) of the M&A announcement, weighted by the acquirer’s and the target’s 
market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement [%].We construct InvCov as follows: We 
compile a list of brokerage houses that cover both the acquirer and the target and we compute the Spearman 
rank correlation in earnings forecasts between these two firms; we also compute the forecast dispersion for 
each of the two firms. InvCov is the product of the Spearman rank correlation and the average forecast 
dispersion, multiplied by negative one. A large positive realization of InvCov suggests a high level of belief 
crossing. We describe how we construct the remaining independent variables in Appendix A1. All 
independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. We include year-fixed effects. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by year. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
InvCov -1.424*** 
(-3.93) 
-1.665*** 
(-4.62) 
-1.713*** 
(-4.72) 
Disagreement -0.350 
(-1.03) 
-0.652* 
(-1.81) 
-0.763** 
(-2.11) 
Crossing -0.013 
(-0.04) 
0.163 
(0.46) 
0.215 
(0.61) 
Acquirer Characteristics:    
    
   ln(Acquirer Market Cap) 
 
-2.610*** 
(-5.51) 
-1.382 
(-1.42) 
   Acquirer Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
0.568 
(1.43) 
0.618 
(1.51) 
   Acquirer ROA 
 
0.387 
(0.72) 
0.321 
(0.60) 
   Acquirer Leverage 
 
-0.164 
(-0.33) 
-0.081 
(-0.16) 
   Acquirer Operating Cash Flow 
 
-0.562 
(-1.04) 
-0.723 
(-1.22) 
   Acquirer ATP Index 
 
-0.294 
(-0.60) 
-0.131 
(-0.27) 
Target Characteristics:    
    
   ln(Target Market Cap) 
 
1.070** 
(2.43) 
0.050 
(0.06) 
   Target Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
-0.395 
(-1.05) 
-0.416 
(-1.12) 
   Target ROA 
 
1.267** 
(2.13) 
1.284** 
(2.13) 
  Target Leverage 
 
-0.048 
(-0.11) 
0.322 
(0.70) 
  Target Operating Cash Flow 
 
-1.355** 
(-2.38) 
-1.333** 
(-2.37) 
  Target ATP Index 
 
0.574 
(0.58) 
0.780 
(0.79) 
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Table 7. Continued. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Deal Characteristics:    
    
   Relative Size 
  
-1.596** 
(-2.12) 
   Combined Idiosyncratic Volatility 
  
0.415 
(0.78) 
   Combined Skewness 
  
-0.123 
(-0.35) 
   Tender Offer 
  
-0.650 
(-0.61) 
   Hostile Offer 
  
2.249 
(0.73) 
   Competing Offers 
  
1.650 
(0.83) 
   Cash Only 
  
2.964*** 
(3.41) 
   Stock Only 
  
-0.551 
(-0.62) 
   Same Industry 
  
0.600 
(0.81) 
    
Fixed Effects Time Time Time 
    
# Obs. 405 405 405 
Adj. R2 0.175 0.272 0.314 
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Table 8. The Effect of Belief Crossing in Other Settings: Conglomerates 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of annual diversification premia on a measure of 
disagreement about the conglomerate’s underlying segments. The dependent variable is the difference 
between the conglomerate’s market-to-book ratio (MB) and its imputed MB, divided by the conglomerate’s 
imputed MB [%]. Imputed MB and Disagreement are the sales-weighted average two-digit-SICMB and the 
sales-weighted average two-digit-SIC price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion across the conglomerate’s 
segments as of t. We use information in June of calendar year t to compute the market value of equity and 
we use accounting data from the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year t-1 to compute the book 
value of equity. Earnings forecasts are for annual earnings with fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. We 
describe how we construct the remaining independent variables in Appendix A1. All independent variables 
are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. In Column (1), we estimate a pooled OLS regression 
with year-fixed effects; t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered by both firm and year. In 
Column (2), we estimate annual Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions; t-statistics are based on Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors with one lag and are reported in parentheses. The Adj. R2 in Column (2) is the 
average Adj. R2 of the cross-sectional regressions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
(1) 
Pooled 
(2) 
Fama-MacBeth 
   
Disagreement    -0.043*** 
(-2.92) 
   -0.069*** 
(-6.10) 
Number of Segments -0.014 
(-1.08) 
   -0.015*** 
(-2.90) 
ln(TotalAssets)    -0.719*** 
(-9.20) 
   -0.849*** 
(-16.98) 
ln(TotalAssets)2    0.621*** 
(7.79) 
   0.732*** 
(15.92) 
Leverage    0.072*** 
(4.69) 
   0.800*** 
(7.14) 
Profitability 0.015 
(1.11) 
   0.026*** 
(3.37) 
Investment Ratio 0.024* 
(1.89) 
   0.031*** 
(3.42) 
Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility    0.059*** 
(3.64) 
   0.048*** 
(3.61) 
Excess Skewness    0.021*** 
(3.19) 
   0.019*** 
(2.86) 
   
# Obs. 14,792 31 
Adj. R2 0.075 0.086 
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Figure 1a. Sources of Information for Investors: A Fund’s Website 
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Figure 1b. Sources of Information for Investors: Other Investment Related Website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1c. Sources of Information for Investors: A Fund’s Fact Sheet 
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Figure 1c. Sources of Information for Investors: A Fund’s Fact Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
